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The economic forces governing transitions between different property rights 
regimes has been the source of extensive study since Demsetz’s path breaking 
1967 essay, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.” This paper offers first a 
general critique of that position, chiefly on the ground that it underestimates the 
practical difficulties of orchestrating efficient transitions in contexts where strong 
political forces are at play. Thereafter, the paper explores the movement among 
various systems that are used to allocate a particular public good, namely 
parking places on public streets. It examines both bottom-up systems that rely on 
analogues to the rule of first possession (in both clear and snowy weather) and 
top-down systems that use meters and permits as allocation devices. It offers 
explanations as to why the optimal rule will tend to vary with the density of 
traffic and generally opposes the use of special permits that limit occupancy to 
residences of certain neighborhoods, which effectively reduce the carrying 
capacity of a system of roads.  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this Conference is to explore the implications of the short but 
profound paper on the origin and structure of property rights that Harold 
Demsetz published in the American Economic Review over 30 years ago.1 The basic 
thesis of his article seems obvious today, but at the time it stimulated extensive 
investigation into several major topics, all of which I shall obliquely address in 
                                                 
*James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law; the Peter and Kirsten Bedford 
Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. My store of anecdotes has been expanded by discussions 
of their own parking problems with Emily Buss, Steven Schwartz, Henry Smith, David Weisbach, 
and Judith Wright. Further tidbits in search of a general theory are welcome. Jeremy Goulka and 
Carl von Merz supplied valuable research assistance. 
1Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (Pap. & Proc. 
1967). [Hereinafter cited as Demsetz]. 
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this article. First, Demsetz articulated a theory about the nature and function of 
property rights, which are created to facilitate “the internalization of harmful and 
beneficial effects,” on the actor who makes decision, i.e. the owner.2 Demsetz 
next explained how property rights regimes evolved in response to changes in 
technology and demand, typically in the direction of greater privatization. Third, 
Demsetz argued that this overall social trend was welcome because systems of 
private property generally outperform systems of common property, for when 
individuals internalize both the costs and benefits of their decisions, then they are 
more likely to advance the social interest as they pursue their own on personal 
advantage. It is for good reason that the law has created institutions whereby 
only those who sow may reap. 
Demsetz thus takes a strong stand about the creation and transition of 
property regimes, and the relative dominance of a system of private property. In 
this paper, I wish to explore some of the themes that Demsetz developed both at 
a theoretical and practical level. First, I shall briefly review what I think to be the 
errors (or at least, the gaps) in the Demsetz presentation. Once these are laid out, 
I shall examine one limited and controlled system that shows the importance of 
filling in the details of Demsetz’s general scheme. My specific purpose in this 
paper is to offer some preliminary observations about the odd equilibrium 
between common and private property in the control of what has been termed 
curb rights3—that is, rights to use curbs on public streets. In some cases these 
curb rights are used for pick up and drop off of passengers, especially by 
commercial operations. But in this study I shall look at the right of ordinary 
owners of vehicles to park on public streets. It is possible to envision multiple 
regimes for the allocation of these spaces. By examining their different forms, I 
hope to shed light on an issue that Demsetz raised in his classic paper, namely 
what forces determine the transition from one regime of property rights to 
another.  
My overall conclusions can be briefly summarized as follows: The Demsetz 
account has the character of a parable or allegory that identifies the beginning 
and end points of a journey. But at the ground level, the historical transitions 
from one system of property rights to another is always far messier than his 
somewhat idyllic portrait indicates. Sometimes the transition from on system of 
property rights to another is completed in happy fashion. But often the steps 
along the journey are more contentious, and more bloody, than Demsetz’s simple 
                                                 
2Id. at 347–50. 
3For the use of the term, see Daniel B. Klein, Adrian Moore & Binyham Reja, Curb Rights: A 
Foundation for Free Enterprise in Urban Transit (1997)[Hereinafter cited as Klein, Moore & Reja].  
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account of property rights suggests. In other cases, the journey toward 
privatization is never undertaken, or never completed because mixed legal 
regimes or systems of common property, rightly understood and regulated, are 
preferable under Demsetz’s own efficiency standard to pure private property 
arrangements. In yet other cases, property may oscillate back and forth between 
private and common forms, sometimes for good reasons but often not. The 
public choice dynamic, so dominant in human affairs, plays a far more powerful 
role in the definition and transformation of property rights systems than 
Demsetz attributed to it. In short, Demsetz paints too simple and too optimistic 
an account of property rights. 
In order to illustrate this point concretely, I take a preliminary and 
impressionistic look at one commons that often lurches uneasily between various 
legal regimes. Thus I take a look at the rules and practices that govern an 
artificial common—public streets and highways—in order to address the 
question of how private rights, chiefly those of parking, stopping, loading and 
unloading, are allocated. These property rights may appear to be small in the 
grand scheme of things relative to the disposition of land, water and other 
natural resources. But parking is in most communities one of the most difficult 
and politically explosive issues to deal with. Anyone who has ever witnessed the 
proceedings of a local planning commission knows how pitched the battles over 
parking can become, and for good reason. A parking place in a downtown high-
rise today can sell for between $40,000 and $50,000, or for around 10 percent the 
value of the condominium unit to which it is attached. Parking places on public 
streets are no doubt less desirable than parking places in enclosed buildings, but 
even if the “fee simple” value of a public parking place were half that of a private 
parking space, there would still be a great deal to fight over in determining who 
owns what. 
The situation with parking places is hardly unique. The battle over the 
spectrum, for example, involved the competition between a top-down system, 
first initiated by 1912 legislation that divided its use between government (chiefly 
naval) and civilian use.4 That top-down system at various times, and for various 
purposes, has allocated spectrum by a simple command and control mechanism, 
by the use of complex licensing procedures for broadcast stations, and by various 
forms of auctions, as for personal communications systems. Yet at the same time 
a bottoms-up system, which operated by persistent occupation and use of a given 
                                                 
4Radio Act of 1912. Act of Aug. 13, 1912. Ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912), (repealed by 
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102).  
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frequency briefly surfaced before it fell under the weight of federal legislation.5 
In dealing with parking spaces, we see some variety in allocation, with bottoms 
up systems, governed by some variation on the first possession system, which is 
awkwardly meshed with a top-down system that uses various forms of permits 
and administrative controls. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
interaction of these various systems to see how various forms of private use 
rights arise on public roads and highways. In making this examination, it 
becomes quite clear that the political and individual forces that are unleashed 
often lead to results that are hard to defend from any social point of view, but 
which are equally difficult to dislodge by the available political means. The 
allocation of common resources does, as Demsetz notes, often lead to highly 
inefficient allocation of resources, but often because of too much privatization, 
not too little.  
The organization of this paper, then, runs as follows. Part I contains a brief 
account of some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Demsetz story of the 
origins and superiority of private property. Part II offers an account of the 
bottoms-up methods of obtaining curb rights on public roads and highways.  
Part III discusses the top-down systems of curb rights under this system. 
I. Demsetz’s Analysis of the Creation and Transition of Property Rights 
Demsetz’s treatment of property rights begins with his interpretation of 
Eleanor Leacock’s account of the evolution of property rights that the Montagnes 
Indians organized for their territory. In the beginning the land was held in 
common, and the Indians operated under an implicit rule of capture, which 
awarded any given animal to the hunter who killed or trapped it, in line with the 
common law rule on the subject.6 For long stretches of time this rule proved 
stable. The demand for furs was limited to the uses that tribe members made of 
them. The dangers of overhunting were therefore limited. It did not make any 
sense therefore for the Montagnes to adopt a more costly system in which each 
hunter (or group of hunters) was granted exclusive rights to hunt in particular 
territories—rights that could have been created for animals which were 
themselves territorial. Any gains from (arguably) more efficient allocative rules 
were more than offset by the higher administrative costs needed to make them 
work. It was but one application of the general trade-off between high 
administrative costs and accurate economic incentives that occur throughout the 
                                                 
5See Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station, Cong. Rec.-Senate 215-219 (December 
10, 1926), discussed in Thomas Hazlett,  33 J. L. & Econ. 133, 148-152 (1990). 
6See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 75, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
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length and breadth of the law:7 when intensity of use is low, simple property 
rights systems with low administrative costs will generally do as well. It is only 
when the intensity of use increases that more complex legal regimes can pay 
their way. 
But that equilibrium position changed once the French became buyers of furs. 
Now demand was no longer limited to local consumption, but spiked mightily as 
furs made their way into the salons of Europe. In the absence of a built-in 
limitation on demand, the loss from overhunting became so large to invite a 
transition in property rights regimes: it now became sensible for the Montagnes 
to bear the costs of delineating and defending territories, which they did. 
Demsetz’s great insight was how the increase in the intensity of uses justified the 
greater administrative expenses of transition to an alternative property rights 
regime that responded to the allocation problem—here by setting up hunting 
territories. It now became worth while, in Demsetz’s terms to take steps to 
internalize the externality, and so the regime of property rights shifted from the 
simpler one of capture to the more complex of territories.  
The same story can be told with other resources. The original regimes for the 
ownership of water, for example, allowed the individual who removes water 
from the ground to claim ownership of it, no matter what the inconvenience to 
others.8 In part the rule has a practical justification, for it is more difficult to 
monitor the movement of water underground than it is, by way of comparison, 
to see whether flowing waters have been unduly appropriated by a single 
riparian.9 But when the levels of dislocation get too high, these so-called 
individualistic systems are replaced, often with real struggle by rules that call 
respect the “correlative rights” of other surface owners.10 The evolution is not 
confined to Anglo-American systems, for the same shift has been observed under 
Japanese water law, and for much the same reasons.11 And a similar history 
                                                 
7For discussion see Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 30–36 (1995). 
8See, e.g., Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843). 
9Id. at 1233–34. The idea of monitoring costs was well understood at an intuitive level by 
nineteenth century judges. 
10See William B. Stoebuck and Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property, Third Edition 429 
(2000). See also, Keys v. Romley, 412 P.529 (Cal. 1966); City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 
Cal.2d 908 (1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 937 (1950); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663 
(1902), rev’d 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). Note that Keys is quite explicit in its assertion that the 
shift from rural to urban use requires a reexamination of fundamental doctrine, after which it 
adopts a vaguish test that requires reasonable use both by upper and lower riparians. 
11See Mark Ramseyer, Water Law in Imperial Japan: Public Goods, Private Claims, and Legal 
Convergence, 18 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1989)  
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could be told of the evolution of rights in oil and gas, where once again the 
greater intensity of use required the adoption of rules (say of pooling or 
unitization) to deal with the correlative effects on others.12 
The battles over the proper allocation of property rights in water, or in oil and 
gas are of course well known. What is odd about Demsetz’s account is that it 
only looks at before and after snapshots of the system of property relations, and 
assumes that the creation of the new system did not introduce new problems of 
its own. His account does not address the question of how the transition took 
place, i.e., what practices were used to resolve disputes when two or more tribal 
groups or members lay claim to the same territory. Nor did it explain what was 
done when the animal territories did not map precisely onto the human 
territories, so that the habitat of some fur-bearing animals, although stable, lay 
partially within the hunting territories of two or more tribes. Because Demsetz 
did not present a detailed account of the transition, he necessarily left unclear the 
division of gains and losses from the reallocation, and the potential political 
consequences, often explosive, of that transition. Did all tribal individual find 
themselves better off after shift? If not, which ones gain, and to what extent and 
why?  
Until these questions on the transition rules are answered it is hard to decide 
whether the transition was worth while for being carried out or not. It could well 
have been some kind of ruse in which massive redistribution of power from one 
group to another was carried out under the guise of creating a more efficient 
alignment of property rights. That result is not confined to resources such as 
water or oil and gas. It routinely happens today when zoning regulations restrict 
the use rights of many in order to entrench the monopoly power of some, by 
blocking entry into markets by owners of nearby lands. Nothing makes it clear 
that illicit redistribution did not happen with the Montagnes Indians.  All that 
can be said with confidence is that the greater the net gains from the transition, 
the greater the dislocations ought to be tolerated along the way. But this is far 
from noting which transitions are efficient and which are not. No global account 
can answer that question. At the positive level, what is needed is a much more 
precise step-by-step analysis of the shift, taking into account the position of those 
who opposed it as well as those who defended. At the normative level is needed 
                                                 
12See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (No. 1), 177 U.S. 190 (1899) Note that while this decision 
did pick up the need for correlative rights in oil and gas, it then missed the public choice 
dimensions of the case, which allowed the in-state gas producers to profit at the expense of out of 
state oil producers. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Modern Uses of Ancient Law, 48 
S. Carolina L. Rev. 243 (1997). 
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some metric which allows judgments to be made about the desirability of the 
transfer when the overall gains appear to be positive, but the distribution of these 
gains appears to be skewed. On that question, it seems as though the best 
position is to require compensation to be provided for losers from the state-
created alteration of property rights, except in those cases where (a) the overall 
social gains from the change are enormous and (b) the costs of finding and 
compensating the losers are high relative to the losses sustained. Here again, it 
seems as though some early cases inched toward that position, as for example by 
holding that the shift from riparian to prior appropriation did not require any 
compensation of the losers given the “imperative necessity” for the change.13 
The second difficulty with Demsetz’s position follows from the first. In a 
manner that parallels Locke’s account of property, Demsetz is too confident from 
this one parable that the efficient transition in property rights moves us from 
common to private property . He thus writes: 
Suppose that land is communally owned. Every person has the right 
to hunt, till, or mine the land. This form of ownership fails to concentrate 
the cost associated with any person’s exercise of his communal right on 
that person. If a person seeks to maximize the value of his communal 
rights, he will tend to overhunt and overwork the land because some of 
the costs of his doing so are borne by others.14 
This account is incomplete for a number of important reasons. In particular, it 
assumes that it is possible to eliminate all externalities by creating the proper 
regime of property rights. But the real question is in fact more difficult. The total 
elimination of these externalities is always an impossibility: externalities occur in 
too many forms and styles. The hard question is what rule would minimize 
them, relative to the costs of their control. Thus it is the uniform rule today that 
the creation of positive externalities is common under a system of private 
property. If A decides to plant a beautiful garden that is visible to all, both his 
neighbors and the public at large will benefit, even though they cannot be 
required to contribute a dime toward its maintenance. In general the efficient 
                                                 
13One such implicit judgment is found in the instructive case of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch 
Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). In that case the riparian system along the Colorado river would have 
allowed riparians to control water running through gorges below while blocking out the prior 
appropriators who actually had invested in facilities to take the water out of the river for 
productive use. Note that it would be quite impossible to figure out how much compensation 
was owing to each of hundreds of riparians who could have exploited the water with difficulty, if 
at all.   
14Id. at 354. 
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solution is one that encourages by social pressures other neighbors to engage in 
similar acts of beautification, but not to tax them for a benefit that they enjoy. To 
be sure, private subdivisions can in some cases counter this problem by imposing 
special assessments on all owners to maintain common areas, or by imposing 
strict aesthetic standards on private use. But the elimination of these externality 
does not prevent the creation of yet another: people who own property near the 
subdivision can free-ride off of the favorable environment that it creates.  The 
only way to internalize all externalities is to have resort to the common 
ownership that Demsetz deplores. And it in this case that system of property 
rights so awkward and unresponsive to its members that other problems are 
created. In the end therefore whether we choose private or common property 
forms, we must tolerate some externalities. 
Third, the Demsetz model assumes that the only two kinds of property 
arrangements that can be devised are an open commons, utterly without 
restrictions on use, and a system of private property. But in fact it is possible to 
devise multiple intermediate legal positions which under some circumstances at 
least will outperform systems of pure private property. Thus one possible mode 
of control treats a commons as open to some but not all individuals. Fields could 
be open for grazing only to members of a given community, but not to outsiders. 
That partial exclusion marks the field as private, after a fashion, but does not 
resolve the question of how use is to be allocated upon eligible community 
members.  
To be sure, in some cases, the problem is not really important: I am not aware 
of any condominium agreement, for example, that imposes limits on the amount 
of time that association members may lounge in the lobby (although it is implicit 
that none are allowed to sleep there). But when the question comes to grazing 
animals in the common, some metering system is needed to determine how 
many animals each user may introduce into the common ground. That allotment 
could be determined by the number of acres (adjusted for quality) that each cattle 
owner contributes to the whole; or it could be determined by a set of fees that 
some cooperative association charges for the admission of animals. But what is 
clear is that keeping the animals in a commons is more efficient than creating tiny 
compartments for all the animals that track the boundaries of agricultural 
holdings.15  The increase in the cost of fencing, and the reduction in space for the 
                                                 
15These fee arrangements have to be limited, for if they could meet the problem completely, 
then there is no need for a commons at all. A single owner could operate some kind of facility 
and charge fees for entry. The reason that this fee system could not work alone is that the lands in 
question may well have reverted to private ownership during the growing season when animals 
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cattle create disadvantages on both the cost and the benefit side. The net effect is 
that a system of private property owners would opt to create voluntarily a 
commons. The secret of their success is to limit the class of uses to one 
standardized use—grazing—so that it becomes possible to monitor both the 
contributions and withdrawals that each party makes from the common asset. 
There are to my knowledge no commons that allows people to “till or mine” the 
lands. For those specific uses private property dominates just as Demsetz says. 
But the common solution, as created by custom or private contract, can easily 
dominate so long as it addresses a constrained set of uses. It becomes an 
empirical question, played out on multiple margins, whether private or common 
uses dominate. 
II. Curb Rights on Public Roads: Bottoms-Up 
The governance issues raised by traditional hunting and agricultural 
commons clearly arise in somewhat different guises in connection with public 
highways and roads. At one level, it is possible to see how these roads are the 
product of voluntary private interaction. The normal subdivision starts under the 
ownership of a single real estate developer whose objective is to maximize the 
gain from sale obtainable by selling off individual units in the subdivision. These 
private owners, even within gated communities, know it becomes necessary to 
create an internal system of roads that allow all members to gain access to each 
other’s home and to the larger community outside. The roads in question will be 
typically restricted to transportation purposes, and the question often arises 
about the extent to which individual unit owners may utilize the side of the road 
for parking, either for themselves or their guests. Here again the limited and 
voluntary commons can determine who can park on the local streets and for 
what hours. The situation involves common property created by voluntary 
agreements. 
The situation becomes, however, much more complex when the question 
turns to the allocation of curb rights along public streets and highways. The 
obvious point is that no longer can any society rely on the single common owner 
to organize the system of property rights in ways that presumptively maximize 
the use of this space. Now other systems of allocation have to be used to decide 
whether, and if so, what forms of parking will be allowed on public streets. The 
problem here is not confined to those cases in which people simply wish to park 
private vehicles along the side of the road. At a broader level the question here 
                                                                                                                                                 
were up in the hills. At this point, the original owners continue to have a stake and use for it.  On 
the mix of commons and private system, see Martin Bailey, Approximate Optimality of 
Aboriginal Property Rights, 18 J. L. & Econ. 183 (1992).   
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also covers the case in which commercial carriers who use the public highways 
can stop at various places in order to pick up customers for carriage to another 
location. This issue raises the question of whether the state with its monopoly 
power over the highways is in a position to dictate that one and only carrier shall 
have the right to pick up and drop of customers along some predetermined 
route. If so, then the state will be able to extend its monopoly position of the 
construction of public roads to the creation of transportation monopolies along 
the roads. 
Yet it seems clear that this position is most unwise as a matter of policy. The 
state runs the system of public highways in order to create one single network 
that allows any person to move from any location on the transportation grid to 
any other location. The monopoly of the state is intended to counteract the 
Balkanization of transportation services that would necessarily arise if ownership 
of the highway system were distributed among several private parties, each with 
the absolute right to exclude. But there is no danger of Balkanization to allow 
rival carriers to operate within a competitive environment on the public roads. 
Hence there has been at least some fleeting recognition in the courts, in 
connection with the so-called doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, that makes 
it improper for the state to use its power to protect established firms against 
competition from new entrants,16 as by banning them to use public roads. And 
the proposals to have markets in curb rights represent an effort by economists to 
superimpose a competitive market in transportation services on the state 
monopoly over public roads.17 The issue is surely critical, for there are all too 
many places where public transportation companies, for example, are granted a 
legal monopoly when private jitney services are not allowed to compete with 
them. 
                                                 
16See Frost & Frost Trucking v. California Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), where the 
court in striking down a rule that required all private carriers to act as common carriers noted 
that “the act, as thus applied, is in no real sense a regulation of the use of the public highways. It 
is a regulation of the business of those who are engaged in using them. Its primary purpose 
evidently is to protect the business of those who are common carriers in fact by controlling 
competitive conditions. Protection or conservation of the highways is not involved.” Id at 591. 
Note that the last reference is meant to allow the state to tax trucks that use public highways so 
that they cover the cost of the damage that they inflict on the road system. Note that the 
interventionist mode in Frost quickly faded to allow the legislature massive deference on 
economic matters. See Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932), where Sutherland, J. effectively 
gutted his earlier decision. For a more detailed analysis, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with 
the State 162–70 (1993). 
17See Klein, Moore, Reja, supra, note 3. 
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In this article, I do not examine the role that a sensible system of curb rights 
can play in organizing a competitive industry. Rather, my focus is to see how 
rights to use the curbs are allocated to the owners of cars and other vehicles, not 
for pick up and drop off of customers, but simply to park their vehicles.  In 
addressing this everyday occurrence, it seems clear that once a car has parked 
alongside the curb for some limited period of time, we have developed some 
system of quasi-private property rights along the public way. The issue is what 
modes of allocation are best able to deal with this particular private use of what 
looks to be a public resource. 
In this regard, development of legal and social practices often follows the 
path taken for other resources that are in some sense held in the commons. The 
great advantage of bottoms-up rules of first possession is that they are cheap to 
administer, and do not require the creation of any complex state administrative 
practice. Just as is the case with wild animals, and with oil and gas, it is no 
surprise that the first rule allocates a parking space to the first parker, as it were. 
The closeness of the analogy is made evident, for even the ambiguous cases fall 
at the same point in the continuum as we move from one setting (e.g., wild 
animals) to another setting (e.g., parked cars). In many ways, for example, the 
first possession rule in parking cases exhibits certain of the characteristics found 
in Pierson v. Post. In Pierson, the Court refused to adopt what appeared to be the 
customary “hot pursuit” rule used in chasing foxes, but held that as a matter of 
law ownership required the owner to capture the animal, a term that could be 
extended to cover only those animals that had been wounded by a pursuer who 
was ready to pounce on them.18 
My own sense of casual empiricism is that, wholly outside of litigation, we do 
adopt this rule for curb spaces. Thus the individual who drives just past a 
parking place in order to back in normally expects that no person who comes on 
the scene a moment later will try to occupy the space by entering it in drive from 
the rear, before the initial claimant has the opportunity to back up into the space. 
In dealing with animals, a strong case can be made that hot pursuit is a more 
efficient rule (at least for foxes) than the capture rule that carried the day in 
Pierson. One advantage of the hot pursuit rule is that it protects the labor of the 
initial chaser by allowing him a clear shot to catch the animal in question: the 
alternative rule encourages freeloading, as “saucy intruders” can carry on the 
chase after the initial hunter and his prey are both exhausted.19 I have little doubt 
that members of the same hunting party clear the way for each other, not only to 
                                                 
18See Pierson, supra note 6, 3 Cai. R. 175 at 179. 
19Id. at 181. 
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protect initial labor, but also to avoid the serious risk of collision that would arise 
as they converge on a single target. (Indeed one reason why the conflict may 
have arisen in Pierson is that the hapless fox got trapped in a well, a setting in the 
usual hunting dynamics of hot pursuit did not apply.) The same rule seems to 
make sense for hunters from different parties, which is why it becomes necessary 
to use custom to supplement contracts in matters of this sort.  
In dealing with parking spaces, we can make the same kind of argument. To 
allow the second party to occupy the space first will have at the margin a 
negative effect on the behavior of the initial driver. He will now have an 
incentive to enter front-first in the space in order to perfect his right against 
outsiders. The legal (or social) norm that recognizes the hot pursuit right thus 
facilitates the adoption of a safer and more convenient mode of parking. Since in 
the long-run it is hard to identify any discrete group of early or late parkers, this 
is one case in which the customary rule, which places all comers behind the veil 
of ignorance, appears to be a sensible (but not indispensable) modification to the 
first possession rule with parking places on the public street. My guess is that 
private associations would adopt this rule as well, if the matter ever came to a 
head. 
The hot pursuit norm will not function as smoothly when it is unclear just 
who arrives first at a particular space. Here the issue is not so likely to take place 
on streets with parallel parking. But it can happen on streets with angled 
parking, or more commonly in parking lots, where there is a high volume of in-
and-out traffic. The usual sociobiological logic behind a first possession rule is 
that all individuals have a strong, innate instinct to yield to others who have 
taken prior possession. Yet by the same token, they have an instinct to fight when 
they think that inchoate possession is theirs. Those conflicts can arise when two 
people come at the same spot from different directions, and each thinks that he 
got there first. All too often these confrontations result in standoffs that block 
traffic for everyone else around. But there is little by way of system design to 
eliminate this annoyance unless and until one moves to a system of central 
assignment of slots. (The parallel here is to the bakery which serves customers by 
number when crowded even though they just take people in order during slack 
periods of business.) 
This same logic of hot pursuit, whatever its limitations, does not justify any 
further extension of the inchoate right—i.e., a right to perfect possession after the 
completion of some well-specified action. Thus with respect to wild animals, no 
one has advocated a rule that allows the first person to see an animal to have the 
exclusive right to hunt, or even the first individual to canter off in the direction of 
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the fox. It is simply too difficult for everyone to obtain notice of who has priority 
under either of these rules, and thus leads to endless conflicts that are largely 
avoided by the hot pursuit rule, under which it is generally evident to all comers 
once one hunter has begun the chase in earnest. But with parking places, certain 
individual sometimes seek to extend the period of inchoate possession. One 
argument that usually loses, without conflict, arises when a person going in the 
wrong direction on a public street spies the space and seeks to turn around in an 
alley to claim it before a second auto going in the right direction comes up and 
claims it. But confrontations do happen when would-be parkers ask a family 
member or friend to stand guard by occupying the parking place until they are 
able to arrive—sometimes only for a minute but often for longer periods of time. 
The practice here is practically limited because it is costly to occupy a space in 
this fashion. Here again my weak anthropological sense is that this practice is 
frowned upon but tolerated even though the inefficiency of the practice, 
however, seems clear enough. People only stand in parking spaces when these 
are at a premium. The practice therefore necessarily reduces the carrying 
capacity of the road and often leads to ugly confrontations when frustrated 
drivers seek to edge their way into parking places defiantly occupied by their 
redoubtable holders. I have little doubt that if this matter were ever brought to 
litigation, the first driver to arrive would win against the prior surrogate. But the 
stakes are usually so low that this has never happened. 
Along these lines, another dubious practice (of which I was once the victim) 
was for a driver to position himself at the rear of a line of parked cars along 
Columbus Avenue, going north, waiting for the first one to become empty, and 
then to pounce on the space in question. (He could engage in that practice 
because traffic was light and Columbus Avenue in downtown Chicago is wide 
enough to allow other cars to pass by unimpeded.) So as I stopped to back into 
the spot on the east side of Columbus Avenue, this fellow drove forward, and 
blocked my entrance with his car, and in a short-conversation claimed a super-
priority for the entire block by having waited first at its south end. I sheepishly 
backed off, as much in confusion and fear as anything else.  
In this tale of woe, however, there was a sense in which he surely had a point 
that I had become, without knowing, a queue jumper from this rather 
improbable scheme for taking possession of the next available space. Thus his 
rule insures that the person who has waited the longest gets the space. The 
alternative rule in effect requires the first comer to guess which space will open 
first, and then to suffer the indignity of a Johnny-come-lately who waits next to 
some other spot that is first vacated. On the other hand, his rule does not do well 
if two or more cars wish to wait for spots, and creates genuine instability if some 
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other aggressive driver should decide to position himself just in front of our 
paladin in order to claim a super-priority (minus one car) for himself. Owing to 
the restrictive conditions under which it is even plausible to claim the super-
priority, and the counterstrategies that it can provoke, it is not surprising that 
this practice is not common enough to give rise to some customary response. 
The problem of ordering individuals by time of entry is, however, an 
important one, which often does provoke an instrumental response in other cases 
where a proprietor has it within his power to organize a queue. Thus for airlines 
and movie theaters, for example, in periods when multiple agents serve only a 
few customers, people form separate lines for each. That situation, however, 
proves unstable as the number of agents increase and the size of the lines gets 
longer, for now A gets generally miffed if B, who arrives after him, gets served 
first by being lucky enough to have gotten on to the end a faster moving line. 
Now as the intensity of the use increases, most airlines and theaters deploy metal 
stands and ropes to organize a single line for waiting and, thus, dispense with 
separate lines for individual customers. The additional costs for organizing this 
system of property rights insures that the first-come, first-served rule holds and 
thus eliminates the resentments that arise when the early comer gets served after 
the late arrival. In this setting, some owner takes charge of the situation, so we do 
not have the unilateral assertion of power by a single individual when no one 
else has notice that the rules of the game have changed. The problem with the 
super-priority driver is that his principled grievance cannot be translated into a 
visible and workable institutional structure. Note too that this single line 
structure depends critically on the fact that the one line does not take up any 
more space than the several lines. That condition is not satisfied when cars back 
up behind toll booths and there it is common enough to see later comers on a fast 
moving line get through the booth before earlier arrivals who have the 
misfortune of getting on the slower line. But since a single line of cars creates a 
real traffic jam, this indignity has to be borne. Once again the details matter 
enormously in setting the optimal allocation rules. 
There is a second deviation from the first possession rule that carries even 
greater weight with parking places on streets. In dealing with foxes or other wild 
animals, it is quite clear that the first possession rule, whether or not modified by 
exceptions for mortal wounding or hot pursuit, gives the successful contestant 
absolute ownership of the chattel in question. And there is really no good reason 
why this should be otherwise. It is hard to see what is gained by allowing only 
limited access to wild animals, especially if hunted for their meat or their fur. 
Indeed in all legal systems the concept of “possession” is always stretched to 
hold that an individual retains possession so long as he has not been 
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dispossessed by another.20 It is just this rule that allows people to leave their 
homes secure in the knowledge that they will still be entitled to use trespassory 
remedies to recover that property from an interloper who enters in his absence. 
But parking places on public streets, like places marked by towels along public 
beaches, offer the successful contestant only a “user” interest in the parking 
space: it remains his only so long as he continues to occupy it. But once he leaves 
the spot it reverts to the common for the next taker on similar user-based terms.  
This truncation of the temporal element exhibits a powerful economic logic 
because any other system will necessarily limit the carrying capacity of the road 
by conferring permanent rights to those individuals who get first dibs, which 
becomes a real problem, as we shall see, in inclement weather, when dibs do 
matter. The upshot of course for that use is that the space on public streets must 
remain idle for long periods of time, just as though it were spaces in a private 
garage. Yet in dealing with parking spaces we do not think that it is appropriate 
to award any fee simple interest in the property because of the labor expended 
for its acquisition, of which there is basically none. The simple first possession 
rule, giving a right of use only, therefore increases the carrying capacity of the 
road. Nor does it carry with it any odd distributional consequences. Every driver 
has multiple plays in the parking game. No one identifies himself as a systematic 
early or late arrival on the public roads. The rule therefore that optimizes the use 
of the road probably works to the advantage of all individuals. We should expect 
therefore the factional fights that arise when the various contenders can peek 
through the veil of ignorance and determine their own spot.  
This insistence of limited times is not unusual in dealing with other forms of 
commons. A similar rule is followed, for example, with spots on beaches and 
besides pools, both on public and private beaches. The customary rule allows the 
early arrival to claim a spot or a chair, by marking it with a towel. That space is 
generally respected for the day, even if people come and go into the water or 
back off the beach. (Sometimes a long absence results in a gradual displacement 
from space.) But come evening all towels are removed, so that priorities must be 
established afresh on the next day. The new competition is easy to run on the 
empty beach or by the empty pool. Generally, it is likely that the earlier users on 
each particular day will, all things equal, make more intensive use of their place, 
so that this truncated first possession rules does a tolerable job allocating space in 
this commons: once again it is just too costly to set up a price system.  
                                                 
20For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Possession, 3 Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and 
the Law 62 (1998). 
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A similar result is found in connection with property rights in news: in 
Associated Press v. International News Service21, which give the gatherer the 
exclusive right to use his own sources, as against his direct competitors only, for 
the period that last no longer than one news cycle, typically a day. That rule 
protects the return of the news service that collects the information, but it allows 
its accounts to be relied on thereafter by the wide range of users, including both 
historical researchers and direct competitors. Information always provides a 
conflict between incentives to gather (which require privatization) and gains 
from broad dissemination (which require the creation of a knowledge commons 
so that information can be utilized at zero price). The mixed solution of limited 
protection created under the common law rule seems on balance to be superior 
to either of two extremes: a commons in which anyone can use the information 
once it is published, and a highly restrictive rule, which allows endless free-
riding on the information collected by others, and the creation of a de facto 
perpetual monopoly in information by virtue of its initial creation. As a first 
approximation, the rules in question look tolerably efficient.  
Dibs in the Snow. The allocation of parking spaces on public streets becomes 
far more complicated in heavy and permanent snow. Just this past winter in 
Chicago, it was commonplace to see dug-out parking spots on side streets, which 
were then marked with chairs, tables, or stools that were (presumably) placed 
there by their owner as a sign that the parking place had an owner who held a 
right to return to the spot at any time. In the local language the party who dug 
out the spot had “dibs” on the space. That term is not even contained in my Funk 
& Wagnall’s dictionary, but its meaning is clear to anyone who has ever had to 
allocate goods of similar kind within a group. One player will say that he “has 
dibs” on the green croquet ball; another will say it for the white. The system in 
effect grants individual rights against the collective to those individuals who self-
select out. This widespread practice generated a fair bit of newspaper 
commentary.22  It has been nobly defended by none less than Chicago’s own 
Richard M. Daley in words that should give warmth to defenders of the labor 
theory of value: “I tell people, if someone spends all that time digging their car 
out, do not drive in that spot. This is Chicago. Fair warning.”23  And it has been 
attacked by Stud Terkel, Chicago’s long-time urban activist who strong 
                                                 
21248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
22See, Jonathan Eig, Chicago Claim Jumpers Are Likely to Have Their Cars Vandalized, Wall 
Street Journal, January 11, 2001; Fran Spielman, Furniture on the Street? Snow More! City Begins 
to Remove Objects to Save Spaces, January 11, 2001. 
23Quoted in Mark Brown, Time to Jettison Chicago’s Space Junk, Chicago Sun Times, 
January 11, 2001, at A1.  
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communitarian commitments led him to observe of the dibs rule: “It’s a 
commentary on the growing oafishness in our lives.”24 
The use of dibs for parking spaces is, of course, more complex, as shall 
become obvious. But for the moment it is useful to start with an obvious point 
about the negative effects of this system. This rule necessarily reduces the 
parking capacity of the street at a time when gathered snow makes parking 
spaces especially difficult to come by. Yet the practice seems to be widely 
tolerated, if not exactly encouraged, and violators of the norm can be punished 
by force. By the same token, it seems clear that this practice does not take place 
on main streets and boulevards, as these are quickly plowed by the Sanitation 
Department, and one proposal to eliminate the practice calls for prompt clearing 
of all side streets.25 But in the absence of this showing of centralized power, what 
explains these persistent outcomes on the side streets where the public force is 
less in evidence? 
The analysis starts with the obvious. It takes time and effort for anyone to dig 
out the spot. No one will therefore undertake this particular case unless he has 
some assurance that he will internalize the future gain from the activity. That 
gain will be too small if it is confined to the ability to use the parking space for a 
single time (just as it will not take place if it is known that the street will be 
promptly plowed and cleared). Hence what is observed is a tradeoff not 
dissimilar to that found in the patent and copyright law. The initial digger of the 
spot is given a limited monopoly for its use—that is one that lasts only until the 
snow melts or is cleared away—as the quid pro quo for clearing out the space in 
the first place. At this point, the question, as with patent and copyrights is, what 
ought that duration to be?  
Under current practice, Chicago style, it appears that the property right lasts 
as long as the dug-out space retains its physical integrity—that is, until the street 
is cleared or the ice and snow melts away. There is, of course, no natural 
necessity that leads to this determination. It is easy to make arguments that the 
proper social position is one that gives the digger exclusive use of the space for 
some more limited time, say a week, after which it then returns to the public 
domain. That kind of fine-tuning is a hallmark of the law of patent and 
copyright, where the statutory periods of protection are subject to explicit 
compromises. But the customary world of dibs, which results from loose social 
interactions, has no place for these refinements. One difficulty is that there is no 
                                                 
24Eig, supra at A1. 
25Metro Briefs, New Snowplowing Plan in the Works, Chicago Sun-Times, February 10, 2001. 
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centralized system (akin to the registration of patents of copyrights) that tells us 
when the meter should run. A second is that no collective decentralized 
mechanism that can set the shorter time period exists. In a world of second-best, 
there is no need to set these spaces because everyone can easily understand that 
the right ends when the space disappears. So the obvious focal point dominates 
over lesser solutions that, however efficient, are also unattainable. 
A similar system of allocation seems to be at work with respect to these dug-
out parking spaces. Thus it seems to be a common practice for homeowners to 
shoo away other individuals who try to dig out the snow near their front door. 
They seem to able to reserve the first right to dig it out for themselves. The rule 
that lets each person dig in front of his own front door does remove at least one 
potent source of conflict. Without further investigation, however, it is not clear 
what happens if that homeowner cannot use the space himself, say, because he 
does not have a car. Is he allowed to designate someone else to dig the spot—and 
to charge for that privilege? Does the space become available to the folks next 
door? Does it revert to the commons so that any one can take the space? As 
usual, customary norms are stronger in dealing with the recurrent clear cases 
than with the marginal ones. 
The complete design of this property regime requires more than rules that 
specify the space and time of the property right. Creating a system of dibs does 
not settle the question of who gets to dig out the space in the first place. In this 
regard one possible solution is to treat the highways as though they were open 
commons, so that any person could dig out any space at any time and claim it as 
their own. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that the property rules here 
do not function in this fashion. It will just not do for someone on Avenue A to 
dig out a space on Avenue B and claim it as his own, at least if the space abuts a 
residence located on Avenue B. Rather, the system seems to resemble the more 
limited commons that are found in connection with riparians rights to water, and 
surface owners rights to drill for oil and gas. In the former case, under both the 
natural user and the reasonable user systems, only riparians have the right to 
take water out of the river, and then they can only remove from their own land—
not at some other place along the river. Similarly, under oil and gas law, oil and 
gas in the ground may move in mysterious ways under the lands of several 
owners, but only surface owners can drill for the oil and gas, and then only from 
their own property, straight down. Both these systems use these spatial 
restrictions to prevent ugly confrontations that would otherwise arise if two or 
more individuals were free to take out either water or oil and gas from the same 
location. Depending on the size of the plots in question, these allocation rules 
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also serve as (weak) devices to counteract the overconsumption problem that 
Demsetz identified with common property. 
This ambiguity over who gets the right to dig parking spaces helps explain 
another part of the overall picture—which is why these dug out spaces do not 
appear on every side street in Chicago and other similar towns. But again some 
casual empiricism seems to supply an answer. The parking places are likely to be 
cleared out on those streets with single-family homes where, when the roads are 
clear, people are usually able to park in front of their homes during the evening. 
As noted, the one-to-one correspondence between owner and space helps solve 
the problem of who gets the right to clear out the spots in the first place. On 
small streets, with apartment houses, that one-to-one correspondence between 
residence and curb space is broken. Parking spaces are at a premium in normal 
times, so that people frequently have to park some distance from their homes. In 
these settings it is more difficult to determine who holds the right to dig out the 
parking space in the first place, so that, where parking is congested, the 
uncertainty of ownership rights ex post will dim the efforts to create these spaces 
ex ante.  
Once the spaces are dug, it becomes necessary to enforce the claims that 
diggers have against the rest of the world including those who do not know how 
and when the spots were cleared. We have some diffuse but irrefutable evidence 
that efficient enforcement takes place; after all, we know that parking places 
continue to be cleared out after heavy snowstorms, and that the stools and chairs 
used to mark these places often remain in these spaces for long periods of time. 
That said, it has to be also clear that most ordinary people are willing to respect 
these parking places, for otherwise the system would come tumbling down of its 
own weight. The question is what conditions tend to facilitate the survival of 
these systems. One obvious condition is that for the most part the main users of 
the side streets are the people who live on them. These individuals know each 
other’s automobiles, and are inclined to adopt a system in which they, as 
insiders, get a positive return from the general action. The insiders can, 
moreover, monitor not only their own spaces, but those that are nearby to 
identify the interlopers who might seek to beat the system. Informal 
cooperatives, not just individual behavior, helps lend stability to the overall 
venture. 
It is equally clear that a system of differential sanctions is invoked against 
those individuals who are brazen enough to occupy the parking spaces created 
by others. Here the folklore in Chicago (both North and South side) is 
indisputable. The owner of the spot will respond with force to any individual 
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who parks his car in the dug-out space. Usually, the sanctions are invoked in 
stages. Thus for first offenders written warnings may be left in windshields, or 
bricks may be placed in cleared out spaces to warn away would-be interlopers. 
Perhaps neighbors offer warnings to keep the outsiders at bay. Once the invasion 
takes place is common to hear stories of cars that have stickers placed over the 
windshields, air let out of their tires (not preferred because now the cars can’t be 
moved), dents on the fenders and doors, and even side mirrors and windows 
smashed in with bricks.26 The cars remain in the space for at least some time so 
that the message that offenders will be punished is hardly mistaken and the car 
in disarray offers a warning to the rest of the world, if such were needed. But it 
could hardly be otherwise. Clearly, we should expect some challenges to the dibs 
system, and unless these were quickly repelled, the entire system would fall of its 
own weight.  
Dibs systems have also overcome a second difficulty. The thug cannot be 
allowed to take over a parking spot by the same tactics used by owners. Once 
again, the very fact that the system continues to operate offers powerful evidence 
that the frequency of interlopers must be quite low. Once again the best 
explanation rests in the cooperative validation of this practice: the true owner 
will be able to marshal sufficient support from his neighbors to retaliate in 
spades against the intruder. Owing to the static nature of the interaction, it is 
easy to determine who counts as a violator—no one is so stupid as to break the 
window of his own car. And it is likely that some adjustments will be made so 
that neighbors who have used the space for limited periods of time, can be asked 
to leave. The outsider knows that the presence of this support network makes it 
risky to park his car overnight in a space in the face of that collective force.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning another weakness of the system. There have 
been scattered reports that nondiggers have claimed exclusive rights to spaces 
dug out by others who have abandoned them.27 From a social point of view, 
there is no reason why these spaces should not revert to the commons. The 
efforts expended by the interloper does not create wealth but only reduces the 
value associated with the space, and should be discouraged. Unfortunately, the 
system does not seem to have a way to weed these latecomers out, but incidents 
of this sort seem to be relatively rare, if only because most outsiders are quickly 
socialized to the local practice and claim the spaces that they clear for themselves.  
                                                 
26See Eig, supra at A1  
27Id., noting the travail of Jenny Loerzel, of Iowa, who shoveled out several spaces without 
ever thinking of claiming ownership of them. Here side mirrors were smashed when she pushed 
aside a chair that occupied the space she had cleared out.  
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The bottom line therefore is that the snow-parking system does work, and in 
so doing provide neat verification for at least one portion of the Demsetz thesis. 
The conditions of scarcity (brought on by the snow) do result in a transformation 
of property rights in parking places quite similar to that which Demsetz 
commented on among the Montagnes. The rule of capture is modified to protect 
the return right over the local territory until the space itself disappears. Hunting 
seasons are obviously not involved, but the possession of the space lasts until the 
snow melts, or better, until the City carts away the snow from the block so as to 
make the exercise unnecessary.    
III. Top Down Allocation of Curb Rights. 
As noted earlier parking spaces on public streets are allocated by multiple 
systems. The bottoms-up rules are in general subject to displacement by clear 
state commands as to who shall and shall not use the public streets. On certain 
main thoroughfares, for example, clear signs indicate that only disabled cars are 
allowed to park on the shoulder of the road. All others must continue on their 
way. This system in general secures very high rates of compliance. Most ordinary 
individuals do not want to park on major thoroughfares. They are within 
walking distance of homes and shops, and both driver and vehicle are subject to 
serious risk of injury and damage. Since these cars stick out like sore thumbs, 
public officials have little difficulty in detecting them, and in imposing large fines 
when they are towed away from the scene of potential dangers. Relatively little 
reliance is placed on some shadowy system of social norms; the heavy lifting is 
done by good old-fashioned sovereign commands. Some portions of the highway 
network resist any efforts at privatization, and for good reason. 
The interaction between top-down and bottom-up systems of controls raises 
more difficult issues on those avenues and streets that are sufficient to support 
both moving traffic and parked vehicles. On most side streets, the public 
presence intervenes only on sporadic occasions, typically when particular blocks 
are ordered clear of cars in order to facilitate street cleaning. Here the system of 
public enforcement is reasonably powerful because it is easy to detect and to 
control violations. The harder issues involved are concerned not with the 
enforcement issues but with the timing issues. Who decides and for what reason 
when street cleaning (or for that matter, street repairs) will take place? The point 
could be of no little matter. The density of parking and traffic uses could easily 
vary in given neighbors by choice of (week) date, and time of day. It may well be 
that less inconvenience is caused all the way round if block A is cleared on 
Mondays and block B is cleared on Tuesday. But it could easily take a good deal 
of political maneuvering to get the right scheduling for the service. The stakes are 
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higher when the issue is the closing of parking spaces for the repairs of streets 
and sidewalks. The usual University of Chicago complaint is that the City’s 
Department of Streets and Sanitation never schedules the work for summer 
when the University is not in session, but manages to put the crews when traffic 
is heaviest in the school year. 
The state intervention on streets and roads assumes a more permanent form 
when the issue is the placement and use of parking meters on public streets. Here 
again we see yet another instance of the familiar trade-offs. A more expensive 
system of property rights is established as the value of the resources increases. 
Thus casual empiricism again makes it evident that these meters are much more 
likely to be found on busy commercial streets than they are on quiet residential 
ones. The case for using parking meters to allocate space cannot be based on any 
naive claim that these are needed to maximize the carrying capacity of the 
streets.  It is precisely because the parking places are always filled that meters are 
introduced in the first place. The real claim here is that the value of the street 
resource is too great for it to be offered efficiently on a first-come, first-served 
basis, for as long as the user wishes to remain. The meters thus introduce a price 
system of sort precisely to increase the rate of turnover on the block. Most 
commonly, the support for the use of meters on commercial streets comes from 
adjacent businesses. There is a powerful correlation between the amount of 
business traffic and the turnover rate of parking. Merchants will sell a lot more 
merchandise if 1,000 cars park on their street for 2 hours each than if 250 cars 
park there for the full business day. The cost of the parking spaces is one way to 
ration these spaces in ways that increase the value of the abutting landowners. 
The prices charged, however, are usually low relative to the value of the spaces 
in question: parking that costs $1.00 per hour on a public street will cost $8.00 to 
$10.00 in the nearby parking garage that may well be less convenient to its users. 
The hard question is why this disequilibrium persists for long periods of time. 
One explanation is that abutting landowners do not have full control in setting 
the metered rates. It is commonplace to observe that the political process does 
not tolerate auctioning off at market value the limited camping spaces available 
in national parks: prices are set well-below the market clearing rate. There is 
always the objection that the poor will be unable to pay the full freight as a 
reason to tolerate the queues that form when prices are depressed below market 
rates. (It hardly seems to matter that most of those on the queues received a 
preference as repeat users.) Similar arguments may well resonate in City Hall as 
well. 
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If, however, it is not possible politically to ration parking spaces by price, it 
may be possible, in the fallback position, to ration them by time. It is common 
therefore to see many City run metered spaces with two or four hour time 
limits—the longer limits being used when the parking spaces are adjacent to 
malls, where parkers are expected to spend longer periods of time. But the shift 
from high prices to time limitations provokes the usual private response. The 
individuals in possession of a space may wish, given the low rates, to remain 
their after their time has expired. Accordingly, they “feed the meter” so as to 
restart the cycle in violation of the general rules. It is, of course, easy to impose 
fines when cars remain parked after the meter has expired. The public official 
need only check the meters periodically to see who is in violation. But when 
parked cars overstay their welcome by refilling the meter, the enforcement 
question is much more difficult. Someone has to mark the cars at one time, and 
then come back two or four hours later to see if they are still there. Those 
markings can only take place at intervals, so that the enforcement system has to 
tolerate major slippage even in the best of circumstances. It is also possible for car 
owners to adopt counterstrategies. I, for example, have seen the astute owner 
dash out of a shop and use a rag to wipe off the chalk-mark that some parking 
officer has placed on the rear wheel. The overall equilibrium therefore is 
unsatisfactory owing to the political reluctance to use a stronger price system. 
The use of parking meters becomes far more controversial for streets that lie 
in mixed neighborhoods—most chiefly on residential streets that lie adjacent to 
commercial streets. In Hyde Park, the streets that meet that qualification are the 
north/south side streets (Kimbark, Kenwood, and Dorchester Avenues) that are 
located next to business streets (here 53rd and 57th Streets) which depend on 
high parking turnover for the operation of restaurants and stores. In the pure 
commercial environment, all merchants share the same attitude. The higher the 
turnover rate in cars, the more likely each of them is to get business. But the 
mixture of residential and commercial establishments creates a real conflict. The 
residents do not wish to pay for parking in front of their own homes, and they 
want to make sure that parking spaces are secure for their household help and 
for their friends. In many cases they wish to block all commercial traffic, but 
failing that, they usually oppose the use of parking meters in front of their 
homes.  
The signs of struggle and compromise are everywhere. Sometimes the meters 
read that money is required only between 8 am and 6 PM. Obviously the effort is 
to give the benefit to the commercial interests during the business hours, but to 
allow residents to park overnight free of charge. In some cases the meters extend 
only a short distance down the residential streets. On Dorchester Avenue, just 
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south of 53rd Street there were four meters on each side of the street, and these 
are typically filled into the early hours of the evening. One block to the east on 
Blackstone, by Giordano’s Pizza place, are six meters, two on the east (Giordano 
side) and four on the west. These metered spaces are always occupied. The street 
also has several no parking zones on both sides of the street and many of these 
spaces are occupied during the peak-demand periods, as are the nearby alleys 
that are supposed to be free of traffic.  
In contrast, no parking meters are found on Kimbark Avenue, north or south 
of 57th Street, but here the congestion is far less because the Ray School occupies 
the east side of the block and thus reduces the demand that local residents have 
for curb space. South of 57th Street, on Kimbark, where the block is heavily 
residential, the first-come, first-serve rule seems to work, because of the delicate 
equilibrium created by local social rhythms. Much of the parking here comes 
from University and Lab School students and employees. These individuals clear 
out after 5 PM, so that the residents can occupy the spaces overnight. Once (and 
if) they leave in the morning then University and Laboratory Schools employees 
and students return to occupy spaces for the remainder of the day. The 
equilibrium is tense, and for the moment is maintained only because many 
students and employees find parking on the Midway, which is usually quite 
empty during the evening hours. But the pressures are building. There have been 
many meetings on parking in which local residents have sought to reduce the 
number of outsiders parking on the streets. One proposal is to prohibit Lab 
School students from parking on the street, which is stoutly resisted by their 
well-connected parents.  But the constant pressure on these sides streets leads to 
the use of a much more powerful device to allocate the commons—the 
residential permit—to which we now turn. 
Permit Parking. The most powerful of the top-down mechanisms for allocating 
parking places is the permit system. These permits specify which individuals are 
entitled to use particular streets for parking. One of the most important set of 
permits are those which are intended to restrict parking on particular blocks to 
its local residents who are required to have Illinois plates. In Chicago the system 
appears to work as follows.28  Permits are issued to all those individuals located 
in a designated region so long as they pay, in addition to the standard $60 per 
year sticker fee, a nominal fee (presently $25.00 per year) that does not come 
close to the fair market value of the permitted spaces. It is well understood that 
these permits do not guarantee any individual dibs on any particular slot: rather 
                                                 
28This information was supplied by Ray Lodato, one of the aides of Alderman Leslie 
Hairston of the 5th Ward. My research assistant, Jeremiah Goulka, collected all this information. 
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all the parking places within that area are open to eligible permit holders. 
Because more cars than permits exist, some permit holders on some occasions 
will find themselves unable to gain access to a protected parking place. The 
system also allows individual owners to issue stickers to their guests for 
particular 24 hour periods. These can be purchased in books of 15, for $3.00 per 
sticker, with a limit of two per customer for any year.29 From the ex ante 
perspective, these limitations do not deprive the permits of their main source of 
value: the exclusion of outsiders increases the odds that insiders will find a 
parking place. 
Permitted spaces of this sort could, of course, be allocated by an auction. That 
process would simply define the areas over which the permits are issued, and 
then indicate the number of slots that will be sold for the number of available 
places. Presumably the ideal system is one in which the City maximized its 
revenue from use. This system would have several real advantages: first the 
auction would generate public revenues that could be used to increase parking 
spaces elsewhere or to defray other City expenses. Second, the system would 
eliminate the need to confine eligibility to residents located on a particular block. 
A person who frequented the neighborhood to take care of an elderly family 
relation or to hold an evening job could bid on the space as well. Unfortunately, 
the current permitting system awards high and low demanders equally, so long 
as they meet the appropriate residential requirements. The auction unbundles 
one neighbor from the next, and each can bid in accordance with the intensity of 
his own preferences. Presumably, much controversy could develop about the 
system of bidding: in an auction for 100 spaces, does each winning bidder pay 
just what he has bid, or only the amount paid by the 100th bidder? But these 
questions pertain to all auctions, and do not raise any special questions here. I 
shall not consider them further. No matter how they are resolved, it looks as 
though the nonterritorial rights of access outperform any system of permits 
based on residency. 
The economic strength of that bidding system is, however, the source of its 
political weakness. Decisions about parking are highly territorial, and the local 
Alderman plays a key role in allocating spaces within the ward. The aldermanic 
currency is ballots. It is not dollars. Hence the political process is skewed in favor 
of an administrative system that looks toward the ostensible gains and losses of 
local residents, and not to any measure of citywide welfare. The commitment to 
the political process then, in a style that should make any FCC Commissioner 
                                                 
29For additional information on fees and terms, see http://www.cityofchicago.org/ 
Revenue/Parking/VehicleSticker.html. 
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proud, requires a process that at every stage turns its back on simple bidding 
mechanisms. In Chicago, the process appears to be governed by a unified legal 
regime in which much depends on the discretion conferred on the local 
alderman, who has a veto power over the designation of permitted parking areas 
within the ward. The first requirement holds that a neighborhood is eligible for 
residential permit parking only if it zoned R5 or less: R8 is the highest density, 
and R1 is the least. The ostensible (and sensible) purpose behind this rule is to 
prevent the introduction of the permit system on those blocks where the high 
demand for street parking makes it likely that a permit system will introduce 
profound dislocations into the local economy. In Hyde Park, for example, the 
neighborhood east of the Illinois Central Tracks, much of it high-rise buildings 
with off-street parking, is zoned R7 and thus is off limits for permit parking. In 
the areas closer to the University, however, some streets are in fact zoned R5 or 
less and thus eligible to apply for permits.  
Under the current system, the application for the permit status requires the 
signatures of at least 65 percent of the residents of a given area. The area in 
question has to be at least one contiguous city block but it may be more. Clearly, 
this requirement leads to a certain amount of game playing, not unlike that 
which goes into the selection of bargaining units under the National Labor 
Relations Act.30 If 80 percent of the registered drivers on one block, and only 60 
percent of the drivers on the second are in favor of the permit system, a 
combined application could yield a larger district, but owing to the weakish 
majority could well lead to a reduction in the chances of success. In contrast the 
use of two smaller districts leads to the automatic rejection of one petition but 
might at the margin increase the changes of gaining the permit system for the 
second neighborhood. The calculations become only more cloudy when it is 
uncertain how many people will support a petition drive, or indeed what 
happens given the normal flows of residents in and out of neighborhoods. And it 
is not clear whether the petitions that are signed, say, for a smaller permitted, be 
can used to support a large permitted area to take advantage of some 
unanticipated shift.31  Nor is it clear as to how often the surveys have to be 
updated to take into account changes in local conditions. 
                                                 
30For discussion of those incentives, see Douglas Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 Va. L. 
Rev. 353 (1984). 
31Probably it should not be. The individuals may well want a permit system for their block 
because they think that their overflow can move to nonpermitted blocks nearby. It is quite 
possible that people who prefer a smaller unit for themselves would oppose therefore a larger 
unit of which they were a part. The system therefore only makes sense when the designated area 
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As might be expected, the strong division of opinion on the desirability of 
these permits has led to some sharp disputes when some local residents have 
refused to sign petitions circulated by their neighbors. Once the petition has been 
signed, then the matter is forwarded to the alderman who has complete 
discretion on whether to continue the process. The current Hyde Park alderman, 
Leslie Hairston loathes these zones and she has not permitted any petition to go 
further in the process. (Hyde Park’s two permit zones have both preceded her.) 
But the aldermen on the North Side of Chicago have typically been much more 
receptive to the creation of these districts, especially in the neighborhoods 
surrounding Wrigley Field where the off street parking is often limited. In those 
cases where the petition is blessed by the alderman, the matter then goes to the 
City Council which initiates a parking study to determine whether the various 
conditions for the creation of a permit zone are met. The results of the study are 
then referred to the City Council Committee on Traffic and Safety. If that 
Committee approves of the zone, the matter then is taken to the full City Council 
for final approval. The elaborate nature of the procedure offers strong testimony 
as to the importance of the issue. 
The key condition for creating a residential parking zone includes a 
demonstration that the designated parking spaces are 85 percent or more utilized 
during the hours for which the permits are requested, and that at least 45 percent 
of the spaces are occupied by cars that are registered outside the zone. The 
evident preference here is to protect local residents against these zones being 
filled up by outsiders. The intuition is that it makes little sense to use the zone to 
exclude the outsiders if they only occupy a small percentage of parking places 
within the neighborhood. But the selection of this, or any other, number does not 
resolve one threshold question because it does not address the inevitable 
problem of seasonal variations in usage rate by outsiders. In Hyde Park that 
number is heavily driven by the time of year. When the University and the 
Laboratory Schools are in session, the number of commuters in Hyde Park 
increases sharply during weekdays. In the summer time and holidays it drops 
off. No effort is made to account for these variations, and local residents 
therefore have a strong incentive to conduct their surveys at times of peak 
external demand. In general, however, the permit system lacks sufficient 
flexibility to cover some portions of the calendar year but not others. That is 
clearly not a necessary feature of all permit zones: in the north side zones around 
Wrigley field, the parking system is structured to preclude outsiders on days 
                                                                                                                                                 
is set from the beginning. Even then, more complicated judgments have to be made when 
multiple petitions for nearby blocks circulate at the same time. 
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(especially nights) when the Cubs play at home. The rule is in response to the 
evident spike in demand for nearby parking facilities. 
There is no question that this intricate system shows clear signs of 
bureaucratic rationality—and clear risks of bureaucratic malfunction. The 
technical requirements do help weed out some blocks from consideration, so all 
the political horsepower is concentrated on those blocks that are eligible for the 
permit system. The technique is similar to that used to allocate broadcast permits, 
where the prospective licensees first have to meet certain limited objective 
standards, before the entire process is thrown open to the tender mercies of 
comparative hearing when two or more applicants survive the initial phase. The 
implicit value to local residents creates unallocated economic rents which in 
familiar fashion invite powerful jockeying for position. Yet, as is the case with 
water rights in the west, the entire system avoids the most obvious charge of a 
giveaway because successful permit holders are charged a low fee that does not 
match the fair market value of the space. 
The social consequences of this system, compared to the auction procedure 
outlined above, are substantial. Any informal count will show that the permit 
system reduces the overall carrying capacity of the city streets by a substantial 
extent. An informal survey of several permitted blocks in Hyde Park during day 
time business hours showed that these streets were often left half or more empty, 
while the nearby commercial blocks were chocked-filled with cars, some of 
which were illegally parked, blocking traffic. These spillover effects influence the 
political process, for the permits system, as one might expect, stoutly opposed by 
nearby merchants who see lost customers who could fill the idle spaces located 
one block away from their businesses. The question of how these permits should 
be filled has become, to say the least, one of the most contentious local political 
issues, for these spillover effects are not captured in the petition process that only 
takes into account the preferences on the block slated for permitting. Such is the 
potential gain for local insiders that Alderman Hairston has stated publicly that 
in her ward every single residential block eligible for permitting has at some time 
applied for one. Her position, however, is to reject all the new requests out -of-
hand, and for the right reasons. The reduction in the overall capacity of the 
system means that permits on one block result in greater congestion on nearby 
streets, often with strong negative consequences for the commercial 
establishments that depend on the nearby street parking in residential neighbors. 
As with broadcast licenses, the absence of any real pricing system leads to 
systematic excessive demand for the slots in question. 
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Handicap Permits. A second contentious issue involves the creation of 
permitted parking for disabled persons. These permits operate under different 
principles from those applied to block permits. Here the application in question 
is for a single space located in front of the residence of the handicapped 
individual. The requirements for the permit no longer center on community 
needs and preferences, but on the plight of the individual applicant. Key to the 
overall process is the ability to obtain a doctor’s certificate that attests to the 
applicant’s handicap so as to warrant the grant of the permit. In addition, certain 
other objective conditions must be satisfied. Under current practice, for example, 
handicap permits are not granted to individuals with garages (although 
individuals may receive block permits to park their cars even if they own garages 
as well). 
The disability permits run into serious problems of administration. The 
sticker is given to one person for one purpose. But the grant is both too narrow 
and too broad relative to its intended purpose. It is too narrow because it only 
covers one designated car used for the transport of a handicapped person. It 
therefore is of limited value to any handicapped child, say, who is chauffeured 
about sometime by his parents and at other times by hired help. Ideally, three or 
four automobiles should be allowed to use the spot. One way to achieve that 
result is to have a removable tag which can be transferred from car to car. But 
that device is not likely to work all that if the drivers of the separate cars are not 
in contact with each other on regular basis. (It is easy for the permit to be 
misplaced if people have to run in and out of the house to get it.) The easy 
portability obviously opens up the fresh possibility that on some occasions the 
tag will be used by other individuals for impermissible purposes. With permitted 
parking, no one doubts that the overnight parking of an eligible car counts as a 
permissible use. But the doubts run deep for cars with handicap tags or stickers. 
No one knows exactly how or why the particular slot can be used. It becomes a 
source of endless resentment when a healthy teenager is seen bounding out of an 
automobile equipped with handicap sticker, when the space has laid vacant for 
most of the day. It is also commonplace to hear stories that doctors are often 
willing to bend the rules, perhaps for a fee, to issue the report for a handicap 
sticker, or that these are retained, or even sold, long after the initial holder of the 
tag has recovered, moved away or died. 
Overall there seems to have been no effective control of abuse once the tags 
have been issued, but the local resentment has led to a crackdown on handicap 
tags in Chicago. The matter is no longer settled at the ward level but has instead 
become a City issue. And the recent evidence suggests that the standards are 
tightening. It should, of course, be possible to do more. Nothing prevents the 
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City from issuing stickers or tags of a distinct color that are valid only for a single 
year: that is routinely done for city taxes and it could be done here. It should also 
be possible to use some form of a picture ID to prevent the illegal transfer of the 
tags in question. But none of these reforms will solve the basic problem that these 
permits provide their lucky holders with something for nothing. The use of a fee 
system based on time and location would effectively crimp the demand and 
reduce the scope and thus curtail the abuse in question. But the politics of 
entitlement make this solution something of a distant hope.  
In sum, the parking situation seems ripe for more systematic study. Precisely 
because parking spaces on public streets are not sold in private transactions, it is 
easy to overlook their enormous value. But anyone who has had any experience 
with the planning process knows that few other local issues are as divisive as the 
parking question. So long as parking places remain in public solution, their use 
will continue to be governed by complex systems of allocation, which will in turn 
unleash the powerful forms of political action so familiar to public choice 
economists. Discovering how the system does act and should act is no easy 
question.  Every alternative has its costs and its imperfections. And all real world 
systems exhibit an uneasy mix of bottoms-up and top-down systems of 
allocation.  
That said, it seems clear that we should be able to do better with parking, just 
as we should be able to do better with the spectrum. The rights in question are 
not vested by the force of time, and the property rights in question are capable of 
reasonably clear definition. On balance it seems as though the progression 
should move from a system of initial occupation to one of metered parking or 
parking permits sold off in some form of auction. Much of this system remains, 
but it is overlaid with an ever more complex system of permits that introduces a 
set of political distortions that are easy to identify in principle but hard to correct 
in practice. In a sense, then, the lesson thus far is not revolutionary: 
understanding how parking places are allocated lends greater depth to the 
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